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Abstract
One of the key issues in K. Polanyi’s (1944, 1957) work is that capitalist markets may
be inconsistent with societal values. This (external) inconsistency eventually leads to a
reaction against the rationale of the market, what Polanyi refers to with the notion of the
double movement. The double movement, in turn, may disrupt the (internal) consistency
of the market, thereby leading to dramatic consequences for society, as was the case with
fascism and nazism. A crucial question therefore is how to achieve a protective response
without undermining society. The paper contends that the two types of (in)consistency
basically depend on the shared knowledge available in a given society. It therefore discusses
how that knowledge arises and how actors may favor or prevent change by acting on
learning processes. The aim is to stress that a policy for change not only requires a
scientiﬁc perspective that is not restricted within disciplinary boundaries, it also requires
a dialogue between social scientists, policy-makers and all those sections of society who
can be aﬀected by a change in the status quo.
Paolo Ramazzotti,U n i v e r s i t ` a di Macerata, Italy.
E-mail: ramazzotti@unimc.it.”The image not only makes society,
society continually remakes the image”
(Boulding 1956, p. 64)
1 Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to draw on the insights of two major schol-
ars - K. Polanyi and H. Simon - to discuss the nature of public policy when
procedurally rational actors base their learning processes on mutually incon-
sistent value systems. The attempt is to understand if there is a way out of
the apparent pendulum between economic constraints to social reform and
societal pressures for a humane society.
One of the key issues in K. Polanyi’s (1944, 1957) work is the divergence
between economic and societal values in modern capitalism. This divergence,
which arises as a result of the peculiarity of the market as a system that tends
towards self-regulation, eventually leads to a reaction against the rationale of
the market, what Polanyi refers to with the notion of the double movement.
Precisely because the double movement contrasts the self-regulating fea-
tures of the market, it may disrupt it and, in so doing, it may lead to dramatic
consequences for society, as was the case with fascism and nazism. It is there-
fore necessary to discuss whether this need be the case and how it might be
avoided. In this perspective, the section that follows provides a synthetic
outline of Polanyi’s main tenets and discusses the bounds that may preclude
the double movement.
In the ﬁrst instance, these bounds are the same outlined by neoclassical
economic theory, whereby economic policy - thus also action associated to
the double movement - may improve equity but at a cost, i.e. by reducing
allocative eﬃciency. The key issue in this approach is that society cannot
interfere with the coordinating function of the market, which is based on
the information transmitting mechanism provided by relative prices. Based
on H. Simon’s work, I argue in section 3 that actors do not merely process
information, they need to interpret it. Interpretation, however, need not be
the same among actors, and this may preclude the internal consistency of the
market as well as the overall consistency of society. Coordination within the
market and in society requires a commonly accepted interpretative frame-
work: a broadly intended shared knowledge must act as a meta-coordinating
instance.
Shared knowledge in modern capitalism, however, is strongly inﬂuenced
by the interests of business. In section 4 I argue that business acts upon the
interpretative frameworks of other actors through propaganda but, above
1all, through the establishment of institutions that eventually provide the
guidelines for learning processes.
The general implication the above discussion leads to is that policy must
be concerned with how actors learn. Its action should focus not only on the
material eﬀects of economic and institutional change but also on the eﬀects
that it produces on learning. In this sense, section 5 argues that what type
of knowledge policy pursues depends on which features of the status quo it
deems open to change. Insofar as it is not marginal change it is pursuing,
policy must conceive of itself as a co-creator of a change-oriented knowledge.
What kind of knowledge it fosters depends on what learning it deems worth
pursuing. This ultimately depends on its views concerning which features of
society are open to change. In other terms, it depends on the, often implicit,
assumptions that underlie the economic theory it resorts to.
2 Double movement and bounded change
In order to adequately frame the problem consider K. Polanyi’s (1957) deﬁ-
nition of the economy in its substantive sense: it is ”The interchange with his
[man’s] natural and social environment, insofar as this results in supplying
him with the means of material want-satisfaction.” (p. 243). According to
Polanyi, the market economy is a speciﬁc type of economy, based on con-
tracted exchange. Like other economic setups it must ensure the material
reproduction of society, its persistence over time. It does so through a price
system which acts as a self-coordinating instance for economic activities.
The economy is a part of society. The social - as opposed to merely
material - reproduction of society requires that market values and societal
values be consistent. It is this external consistency between the economy and
society that Polanyi referred to with his notion of embeddedness. However
it is in the nature of the market to move towards complete autonomy and
self regulation.1 This contrasts with the irreducibility of nature and human
beings to commodities. Any attempt to continue in this direction would lead
to a social catastrophe. External inconsistency may therefore determine an
opposition to the rationale of the market and cause what Polanyi termed
the ”double movement” whereby the movement in favor of a self-regulating
1Hodgson’s (1988, 1999) impurity principle points to the impracticability of a market
based on pure (contracted) exchange. In this perspective it is important to stress that,
according to Polanyi, the market’s drive towards self regulation (thus pure exchange) is
never fully achieved because of the protective responses it determines (Rodrigues 2004).
Nevertheless, contracted exchange is the (albeit contradictory) rationale underlying the
above drive towards self regulation, which suggests that a continuous distinction between
market and exchange is of marginal importance for what follows.
2market is contrasted by a counter-movement in favor of a self-protecting
society. Block (2000/2001) provides a vivid illustration of the need for the
double movement: ”one might say that disembedding the market is similar
to stretching a giant elastic band. Eﬀorts to bring about greater autonomy
of the market increase the level of tension. With further stretching, either
the band will snap - representing social disintegration - or the economy will
revert to a more embedded position.” (p. 9).
The double movement, however, contrasts business - or sections of it - and
this way aﬀects society’s material and social reproduction. In some instances
it may even lead to a catastrophic outcome. Indeed, fascism according to
Polanyi arose because the double movement proved to be disruptive (Polanyi
1957, ch. 7). If we push Bloch’s analogy to its extremes, one might suggest
that re-embedding the market may also lead to a breaking point. Thus, the
issue that arises is how we are to avoid both ”snaps”.
A pragmatic approach might be to rely on moderation. The problem,
here, is what moderation consists in. For instance, is the commodiﬁcation of
workers acceptable provided they are paid a fair wage? Is fairness a societal
or economic value? How does a fair wage relate to a market compatible
wage? Can the latter be assessed? An answer to these questions would be
fairly easy if the market was conceived of as the coordinating mechanism that
conventional economists have in mind. According to this view, the internal
consistency of the price mechanism is a necessary condition for the material
reproduction of society. Societal values (e.g. equity) may be pursued but
this usually involves a loss in eﬃciency, measured in terms of a trade oﬀ.
Thus, any action is possible but at a cost that the market itself determines.
The greater the thrust towards non market societal values, the more likely
it is that the economy will be unable to ensure the material reproduction of
society.
This is not Polanyi’s view. He argues that the market is not the only
type of economy available: reciprocity and redistribution may either sub-
stitute or complement it. Market constraints need not constitute absolute
impediments to the achievement of societal goals: alternative economic se-
tups are possible.2 In fact, redistribution does occur in modern welfare states
and reciprocity is a key feature of a variety of activities ranging from charities
to political parties. Thus, the issue is how the co-existence of contracted ex-
change with these forms of economic integration aﬀects the relation between
internal and external consistency. In other terms, can the ’interference’ of
redistribution and reciprocity aﬀect the market’s self-coordination?
2This does not imply, however, that alternative setups are a priori preferable to ex-
change, nor does it imply that they can be easily established.
33 Choice and the learning process
In a conventional (neoclassical) setting a market is supposed to collect and
diﬀuse information on the relative scarcity of resources and on individual
preferences. Undiﬀerentiated actors need to choose on the basis of the in-
formation they gather from the market. They do so by maximizing, which
requires that they choose in a substantively - in Simon’s (1988) sense - ratio-
nal way. The problem with this approach is that the limited mental capability
of human beings precludes their ability to choose in a substantively ratio-
nal way, except in very special cases (Simon 1972). In general, a diﬀerent
approach to choice is called for. Following Simon’s suggestion (ibid.) let us
focus on the implications of procedural rationality.
Choice involves the existence of a goal, which - owing to bounded ratio-
nality - may not be clearly identiﬁed at the outset (”I want to buy a car”
rather than ”I want to buy model X of brand Y”). The identiﬁcation of the
goal is strictly related to the choice set that is available (what automobile
models are available? How much can I aﬀord to spend? How long can I keep
on searching?). How these issues are dealt with - i.e. how the overall problem
is framed - involves the use of existing knowledge, which provides the lens
through which an actor perceives reality. Existing knowledge also provides a
framework to assess whether a problem may be deemed analogous to others
which were solved according to a speciﬁc procedure: heuristics are generally
based on such experience. Previously acquired knowledge therefore provides
a scaﬀolding to support further knowledge (Newell, Simon, Shaw 1958).
The implication is that, since each individual is subject to speciﬁc expe-
riences, learning is - at least to some extent - an idiosyncratic process. Thus,
there is no absolute criterion to process the information that prices provide.
Even if contracted exchange were to eﬀectively transmit information through-
out the economy, that same data would be interpreted in diﬀerent ways and
diﬀerent interpretations would feed back on that very data. Contrary to
the claims of conventional theory, the market cannot achieve internal consis-
tency on the basis of information alone. Following Simon’s contribution to
economic thought, knowledge and interpretative frameworks - as opposed to
information processing - are a key element if we wish to understand economic
behavior and choice.3
3Institutions are usually claimed to provide guidelines in a world of uncertainty and
are supposed to complement the market in its coordinating function (North 1990). Insti-
tutions, however, need to be understood, i.e. interpreted. A signpost is not enough if it is
not subject to a common - or mutually compatible - interpretation. Similarly, economic
institutions require a common interpretative background. Although loose coupling allows
for some inconsistencies, which in turn allow change to occur (Loasby 1991), a common
4Overall knowledge includes tacit as well as explicit knowledge. Explicit
knowledge is what we know that we know and what we know that we do not
know (Rooney et al. 2003). Tacit knowledge, in turn, is all the background
knowledge that supports explicit knowledge, thus all those things an actor
may be unaware of but without which she would be unable to actually un-
derstand reality. By being tacitly accepted, this knowledge avoids her the
eﬀort to continuously reassess what she already (believes she) understood.
Since it is taken for granted, it is also one of those aspects of knowledge that
is hardly questioned.4 It often includes the beliefs - i.e. explicit or implicit
assumptions concerning reality - that actors resort to when they must for-
mulate decisions but lack the required information or are unable to ﬁt the
information they have within the knowledge they have.5
Three implications are worth pointing out. First, in order for a market
to coordinate economic activity, and to be internally consistent, actors must
interpret that information and the interpretative frameworks they use must
be mutually compatible. Since interpretative frameworks arise out of avail-
able knowledge, how the market functions ultimately depends on society’s
shared knowledge.
The second implication is that the distinction that the conventional ap-
proach would draw between external and internal consistency is not as clear
cut as one might think. External consistency - the compatibility between so-
cietal values and economic outcomes - and internal consistency - the compat-
ibility between the economic choices of all the actors involved - both depend
on the interpretative frameworks that individuals resort to. Ultimately, they
depend on society’s knowledge. It is doubtful that the latter can be split into
two independent sections: the econom i ca n dt h en o n - e c o n o m i co n e .
The third implication is that society may avoid being disrupted by the
double movement only if it shares a common view of what its goals are. In
terms of both economic and societal coordination, what is required is that
society’s knowledge act as a meta-coordinating instance.
interpretative framework is required in order to prevent that a clash of divergent views
disrupt the economy and society.
4What I am referring to is what M. Polanyi (1962) denotes ”the whole system of
acceptances that are logically prior to any particular assertion of our own, prior to holding
any particular piece of knowledge.” (p. 267). Following this perspective, tacit knowledge
is not just uncodiﬁed information.
5In this perspective overall knowledge is tantamount to culture, i.e. to the shared view
that actors have of the world they live in.
54 Shared knowledge as a meta-coordinating
device
The issues discussed in the previous section will be clearer by considering
business behavior, i.e. by focusing on the distinguishing element of a capital-
ist market. Business generally pursues a proﬁt by hiring workers, producing
goods and selling them to customers. Customers must know the characteris-
tics of the goods. When they do not, they need to learn. In some instances
learning is straightforward: in most countries people eat bread, so they search
for it, they try diﬀerent types and they eventually choose which one they pre-
fer. There are instances, however, where people need to be informed about
the very existence of a good. This typically occurs when a new product is
introduced in the market. There are still other instances where information
is not enough. The features of a good may be diﬃcult to appreciate, owing
to technical complexity or because the potential buyer cannot easily under-
stand how the good is supposed to satisfy her needs. Thus, ﬁrms may sell
their products only if their potential customers have both the appropriate
information and the interpretative framework to appreciate that information.
In most cases it is up to the ﬁrms to provide both. They have all to gain
from doing so.
Competition among ﬁrms allows more information to be circulated. Since
each ﬁrm wishes to show that its good is better than others, potential cus-
tomers are in a better condition to make comparisons. Competition, how-
ever, does not always allow customers to identify appropriate interpretative
frameworks. While a pharmaceutical ﬁrm will try to prove that the drug it
manufactures is better than its competitor’s drug, no ﬁrm will care to provide
information or a cognitive framework that takes into account prevention as
opposed to cure (unless there is something to gain from prevention as well).
Public debate over the quality of the goods occurs within an interpretative
framework that is consistent with the proﬁt constraint of the ﬁrms involved.
Truly, while drug producers may not be concerned with prevention, other
ﬁrms - e.g. those that deal with environmental issues - may have an interest
in dealing with it. Thus, as the range of industries potentially involved
grows, the information that is circulated increases and the interpretative
framework becomes more comprehensive. This would seem to be the case
where the market provides the required shared knowledge that coordination
requires. Note, however, that in the most favorable of conditions the available
interpretative framework will be one where all the proﬁtable opportunities are
taken account of. All interpretative frameworks that transcend the bounds
set out by the proﬁt motive will be missing.
6Knowledge, however, does not depend only on economic choice, with its
related problem solving activities. The boundaries provided by the proﬁt
constraint are irrelevant for a great many problem solving activities. Learn-
ing may simply consist in making sense of something, independently of any
direct application to choice. In fact, an individual may choose not to deﬁne
boundaries too strictly or even to change them as she goes about learning.
This may occur both in strictly scientiﬁc research6 as well as in making sense
of life and choosing how to conduct it. It is also the case with Veblen’s notion
of idle learning.
Extra-economic interpretative frameworks may therefore arise indepen-
dently of learning processes that are associated to economic choice. At the
same time, however, these extra-economic interpretative frameworks may
feed back on economic decisions. This is the case when ethical considera-
tions lead to restrictions on economic activity, as with child labor or working
time.7
These considerations on knowledge suggests that, contrary to Hayek (1949,
p. 80), ”the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place”
that a consumer has is not all she needs to choose appropriately. She may
well want to take more general features of knowledge into account. Thus,
she may believe that the metric that is required to assess economic welfare
need not be the same that is required to assess social well being (Sen 1999).8
Under the above circumstances it is important to investigate what hap-
pens when diﬀerent interpretative frameworks - e.g. market and non-market
- clash. Typical cases are when workers within a ﬁrm base their claim for a
higher share of income on ethical principles (e.g. the human right to a decent
standard of living) or when client ﬁrms - those that carry out complementary
(upstream or downstream) activities with the ﬁrm under exam - also claim
a higher share in distribution (e.g. on the grounds of fair pricing).
Since claims by other parties are likely to contrast the proﬁt goal of a
ﬁrm, the latter will have to react. Under these circumstances, the division
of labor within the ﬁrm as well as among ﬁrms may be assigned a ’political’
task. In the ﬁrst instance the organization of production may have to be
6M. Polanyi (1962) mentions the case of research in Mathematics as one where the
goals and the boundaries of the problems to be solved change as advances in the discipline
occur.
7In this perspective, the potential conﬂict that A. Sen (1982) points out, between (eco-
nomic) preferences and (ethical) meta-preferences, is possible precisely because diﬀerent
interpretative frameworks co-exist.
8If diﬀerent metrics exist, it is likely that - contrary to Coase (1988) - social costs, which
are measured in terms of social well being, cannot be internalized in the price mechanism,
which relates to economic welfare (Kapp 1963a; b). The similarities between K. Polanyi
and K.W. Kapp are highlighted by Swaney and Evers (1989).
7devised in such a way that the other parties do not have the bargaining
power to claim higher distributive shares. A further step is to avoid even the
insurgence of a distributional conﬂict: the parties would have to feel that the
status quo is either the only or the best achievable one. These two situations
are what Gramsci refers to as control and consensus respectively. Control
occurs when the parties would want to realize an alternative but cannot. It
has to do with the balance of power among the actors. Consensus implies
that the actors do not think an alternative is possible. This has to do with
what they know and how they know. If the division of labor is devised so
that workers or client ﬁrms do not know how economic activities are being
carried out, this prevents actors from envisaging possible alternatives to the
status quo (Marglin 1978; Ramazzotti 2004).
The above example suggests that the establishment of an interpretative
framework does not occur through propaganda (e.g. advertisements) alone.
It depends on what people can learn, which depends on how markets are
organized and on how production is organized. The institutionalization of
consumption and working patterns determines an important part of the world
actors live in. Insofar as these patterns persist over time, they tend to be
taken for granted. Rather than being potentially subject to questioning,
they become a part of tacit knowledge: they point to what is ”socially”
possible or appropriate (Zucker 1977).9 From this perspective, they provide
the conditions for external consistency.
These considerations apply to what actors deem technically possible.
Technology generally is the outcome - through innovation - of a problem
solving process, which depends on a more or less deﬁned goal - e.g. ﬁnd-
ing a cure for malaria - and on boundaries that circumscribe the problem.
Aside from available knowledge, a boundary is generally provided by the
proﬁt constraint, whereby the innovation must eventually ensure a return.
From a business perspective only potentially proﬁtable technologies are worth
seeking. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that, owing to the prevailing
distribution of world income, research in goods associated to conspicuous
consumption in industrialized countries is going to be livelier and more prof-
itable than research that tries to ﬁnd appropriate drugs for tropical diseases.10
Although unexpected innovations are always possible, as the unintended con-
9This is what Scott (1995) refers to as the cognitive pillar of institutions.
10The relation between these considerations and Polanyi’s approach is pointed out by
Cangiani (2003:337): ”The starting point in Polanyi’s essay is that in a market economy []
the economic system tends to be self-referential. Since the choices and the very selection
of information are determined or biased by ’the principle of gain and proﬁt’, ’economic’
eﬃciency cannot be immediately and in general considered as coinciding with eﬃciency
from the point of view of society.”
8sequences of economic action, when technological evolution is subject to the
proﬁt constraint it entails an overall pattern of innovation - thus technolog-
ical paradigms and trajectories - that reﬂects privatistic, rather than social,
priorities. Technological paradigms and trajectories, in turn, favor some in-
stitutional setups while precluding others.
Conventional theory acknowledges that science and technology are, at
least in some instances, public goods: single economic actors may not ﬁnd
it convenient to engage in research even though they might all gain from
scientiﬁc and technological progress.11 The policy implication is that public
funding - based on redistribution rather than exchange - may be necessary.
The discussion above leads to somewhat similar conclusions. It suggests that
the pattern of technological development depends on the kind of research that
is carried out - i.e. what questions are asked - and that the latter depends on
what priorities are selected.12 In the standard public good case, the priority
is collective (and, one might suggest, long term) proﬁtability or growth. In
the case here discussed, the priority is a social welfare that transcends proﬁt,
even though it need not preclude it.13
Technology is a major determinant of the institutional setup of society.
It determines the technical conditions for proﬁtable economic activity. It
also provides interpretative frameworks. In terms of production processes,
workers and ﬁrms cannot expect to carry out their tasks in a manner which is
deemed ”technically” inappropriate. In terms of output, consumers can ask
for only what is available; they cannot demand what is deemed ”technically”
impossible to produce. Ultimately, technology is an important component of
shared knowledge. Contrary to conventional views, it provides the conditions
for, rather than the constraints to, both internal and external consistency.
5 Policymaking and knowledge
Let us now return to the consistency issue. I already argued that there is a
wide range of possible economic arrangements, depending on how reciprocity,
redistribution and contracted exchange interact. In order for consistency to
occur both within the economy and between the economy and society, actors
must share a common view of how the economy and society are (and should
11This is particularly so with basic - as opposed to applied - research.
12K.W Kapp (1976) noted that eﬃciency in agriculture is usually measured in terms of
output per working hour or of output per hectare whereas in some important instances it
would be more appropriate to measure it in terms of output per unit of enrgy.
13Independently of what generates it, once technological progress changes relative prices,
new business opportunities arise, thereby enhancing the production of some goods rather
than others and the use of some production processes rather than others.
9be) arranged, what I referred to as shared knowledge. This knowledge is
strongly aﬀected by institutions, such as the division of labor or consumption
patterns, which generally reﬂect the interests of business.
The double movement reﬂects a breach in a society’s shared knowledge.
It consists in a pressure to change the existing combination of reciprocity,
redistribution and contracted exchange. In so doing, it is most likely to clash
with vested interests. What deserves attention, however, is that it may also
clash with those elements of shared knowledge that are not being questioned.
Three cases are worth pointing out. First, at a strictly economic level. it
may change the business outlook (expectations): new claims on how to run
the economy may increase uncertainty as to what conducts should and will
prevail and what performance will result. In other terms, the degree of tur-
bulence of the economy may be expected to rise, all other things given. This
may negatively aﬀect accumulation and growth. Second, at the institutional
level, it may undermine established views which are believed to be at the
roots of existing society. Consider, for instance, how restrictions on traﬃc
or smoking may be interpreted as detrimental to individual freedom. Third,
at the technology level, it may be deemed inconsistent with the technical
requirements for economic activity.
Diﬀerent types of change are possible, under these circumstances, de-
pending on how actors relate to the above elements. They may accept the
economic, institutional and technological contexts as general bounds. Alter-
natively, they may act upon these general features in order to change them.
The ﬁrst approach implies that change only consists in economic and societal
adaptation to external shocks and to endogenous (spontaneous) evolution.
Basically, it considers the status quo as improvable only at the margin. The
second approach considers the existing economic and societal setup as only
one out of a range of possible ones. Between these two extremes lies a range of
intermediate approaches, which are distinguished in terms of what is deemed
exogenous, i.e. not subject to purposeful change.
Far from relying on a demiurgical act of will, the second approach - which
we might call progressive change - assumes that change is possible but that
it does not consist in merely deciding - possibly through elections - that
a diﬀerent society must be organized. It acknowledges that the reactions of
social interests, constraints arising from social rigidity and technological path
dependence may prevent change. These constraints to change may occur on
”technical” grounds, in that the economic, institutional and technological
contexts may require time to adapt to the new requirements that emerge
from society. They may do so on cognitive grounds: actors must make sense
of whatever change the economy and society undergo. From this perspective,
it is important to stress that awareness that change is possible is not the result
10of a merely intellectual process. Economic and societal coordination requires
a fairly consistent interpretative framework, which cannot arise other than
through the interaction between economic and institutional change on the
one hand and learning on the other. Thus, change has to do with a societal
reassessment of the knowledge that is embedded in technology, in institutions
and in the resulting beliefs that underlie common sense.
Policymaking is necessary to ensure that internal and external consistency
is achieved. But these consistencies depend on shared knowledge, thus on the
image of a diﬀerent societal setup - including societal goals - that gradually
emerges. The scope for policymaking, therefore, is to establish a speciﬁc
knowledge framework, i.e. an interpretative framework of reality whereby
the status quo is not taken for granted but may be progressively changed.
In turn, policymaking can enhance actual change only by feeding upon what
social actors deem necessary as well as possible.
Progressive policymaking is, in this perspective, a special type of ac-
tion because it needs to focus on the creation of new knowledge as a meta-
coordinating instance. While it may involve speciﬁc technical measures, its
general goal is not strictly technical: it consists in enhancing people’s aware-
ness that change is actually possible. It is this awareness that allows all
individuals to carry out a search process to identify where and how it is pos-
sible to act on the economy and on society. It is this same awareness that
makes them receptive of whatever change is actually occurring.
Policy makers and (sections of) the community need to interact if pro-
gressive change is to come about. This may not occur, however. Policy
makers may reﬂect vested interests or the interpretative frameworks that de-
fend those interests. Policy may therefore restrict the potential for a diﬀerent
outlook on society. Similarly, the extant shared knowledge framework may
preclude people from envisaging change. There apparently is no way to pre-
dict what path society may eventually follow but the very openness of the
learning process, its irreducibility to a mere business outlook, suggests that
societal change need not be bound by the latter.
6 Final remarks
In a society where diﬀerent groups of economic actors are characterized by
distinct interests, learning occurs in diﬀerent ways, that is to say, it is cen-
tered on diﬀerent goals and it reﬂects diﬀerent ways to frame a problem.
Owing to the central role that knowledge plays, it is in the interest of each
party to aﬀect learning and knowledge so as to exert control over, or achieve
the consensus of, other parties. Firms act on knowledge both when they
11interact with their potential customers and when they interact with workers
and other ﬁrms.
What is at issue is not the distortion of truth but the viewpoint chosen,
thus the priorities assigned. As far as ﬁrms are concerned, their priority is
proﬁt. Alternative priorities may relate to strictly economic issues, such as
distribution, or to issues which are generally not viewed as strictly economic
- e.g. gender issues, environmental issues, world poverty, and peace - but
eventually aﬀect the way economic relations are structured.
Progressive change, i.e. change that is not restricted within the bounds
of exchange and its associated business interests, involves the interaction
between policy makers and (sections of) the community. In this perspective,
policy makers must enhance a general outlook of society whereby change
is possible. They must favor attempts to envisage diﬀerent economic and
societal setups. In turn, the measures they take, to change the economy
and its institutions, have to be consistent with the overall view of a possible
society that emerges out of society itself.
This suggests that progressive policy is a sort of non-technocratic pa-
ternalism. It is non-technocratic because it acknowledges that its action is
based on priorities and constraints that are cognitive as well as technical.
It is paternalistic because it has to enhance full awareness through learning
processes, and the appropriateness of these processes depends on the interac-
tion between public policy and the knowledge related policy of other actors,
primarily business.
The general conclusion of the above discussion is that formal democracy is
a necessary but deﬁnitely not a suﬃcient requirement for progressive change
A double movement in cognition is also required, which considers learning
as a manifold process, based on the institutional setup of a society. This
paper only provides an outline of why this is so. Hopefully, further research
will provide a more in-depth understanding of how it can occur. A possible
step in this direction may be to extend the above inquiry to the multiplic-
ity of collective agents that make up a community, thereby overcoming the
implicitly assumed dualism between policymakers and society.
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